I affirm resolved: In the United States, the private ownership of handguns ought to be banned.

I value morality.

First, because there is no universal moral account for individual reason only moral theories that recognize other’s accounts are sensical. Nagel: Nagel, Thomas [University Professor of Philosophy and Law at New York University]. *The View from Nowhere*. New York: Oxford UP, 1989. Print.

In the pursuit of this goal, however, even at its most successful, something will inevitably be lost. **If we try to understand experience from an objective viewpoint** that is **distinct from that of subject of the experience**, then even if we continue to credit its perspectivial nature, **we will not be able to grasp its most specific qualities** unless we can imagine them subjectively. We will not know exactly how scrambled eggs taste to a cockroach even if we develop a detailed objective phenomenology of the cockroach sense of taste. When it comes to values, goals, and forms of life, the gulf may be even more profound. Since this is so, no objective conception of the mental world can include it all. But in that case it may be asked what the point is of looking for such a conception. The aim was to place perspective and their contents in a world seen from no particular point of view. It turns out that some aspects of those perspectives cannot be fully understood in terms of an objective concept of mind. But if some aspects of reality can’t be captured in an objective conception, why not forget the ambition of capturing as much of it as possible? The world just isn’t the world as it appears to one highly abstracted point of view that can be pursued by all rational beings. And if one can’t have complete objectivity, the goal of capturing as much of reality as one can in an objective net is pointless and unmotivated. I don’t think this follows. The pursuit of a conception of the world that doesn’t put us at the center is an expression of philosophical realism, all the more so if it does not assume that everything real can be reached by such a conception. Reality is not just objective reality, and **any objective conception of reality must** include an **acknowledg[e**]ment of **its own incompleteness**. (This is an important qualification to the claims of objectivity in other areas as well.) Even if **an objective** general **conception** of mind were developed and added to the physical conception of objectivity, **it would have to include the qualification that the exact character of each of the** experimental and intentional **perspectives with which it deals can be understood only** from within or **by subjective imagination**. A being with total imaginative power could understand it all from inside, but an ordinary being using an objective concept of mind will not. In saying this we have not given up the idea of the way the world really is, independently of how it appears to us or to any particular occupant of it. We have only given up the idea that this coincides with what can be objectively understood. The way the world is includes appearances, and **there is no single point of view** from which they can all be fully grasped. An objective conception of mind acknowledges that the features of our own minds that cannot be objectively grasped are examples of a more general subjectivity, of which other examples lie beyond our subjective grasp as well.

Next, Moral theories must explain the motivation behind action. **Scanlon:** Scanlon, Thomas. *What We Owe to Each Other*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap of Harvard UP, 2000. Print.

**A** satisfactory **moral theory needs to explain the** reason-giving and **motivating force of judgments of right and wrong**. This is commonly referred to as the problem of explaining moral motivation. I will continue to use this familiar label, but I want to stress at the outset that it is misleading in two important respects. First, it suggests that the problem in question is one of understanding how people are motivated rather than of understanding the reasons they have. As explained in Chapter 1, I hold that the question of reasons is primary and that once the relevant reasons are understood there is no separate problem of motivation. Second, the term **“moral motivation**” suggests a problem about motivation, or reasons, for *action:* a problem of understanding a special form of motivation, or a special kind of reason, that is triggered when one decides that it would be wrong not to do some- thing, and can move one, even in the face of strong countervailing considerations, to do it. As I will argue below, this formulation seems to me to be overly narrow. But, taking the problem in this form for the moment, I want to examine some of the questions it raises and some of the problems involved in answering them. The task of explaining how the fact that an action would be wrong provides a reason not to do it can be seen, ~rst, as a task of self-under- standing: we want to understand the reasons we are responding to when we are moved by moral considerations. But there seems to be more at stake than mere interpretation of the reasons we take our- selves to have. Even from the point of view of those of us who already care about right and wrong, a mere portrait of what it is we care about may seem to give us less than what we want: **what we want to know is not merely what we care about** when we care about right and wrong **but why this is something we must care about.** This concern is magni~ed when we turn to consider others: **it seems that an adequate account of the morality** of right and wrong s**hould explain** not merely what those who care about it are moved by but also **why its importance is something that everyone has strong reason to recognize**. This might be put by saying that what the question “Why be moral?” calls for is not mere self-understanding but justi~cation: an account of why we and others have compelling reason to be moral. But ‘justi~cation’ is a misleading term for what is needed here. It is mis- leading to say that what those of us who already care about right and wrong are looking for in our own case is a justi~cation, because this suggests that we think we should abandon our concern with right and wrong unless some additional ground for it can be provided. It is also misleading to say that we are looking for a way of justifying the morality of right and wrong to someone who does not care about it—an “amoralist”—because this suggests that what we are looking for is an argument that begins from something to which such a person must be already committed and shows that anyone who accepts this starting point must recognize the authority of the morality of right and wrong. I myself doubt whether such a justication can always be provided. What we can provide, and what seems to me suf~cient to answer our reasonable concerns, is a fuller explanation of the reasons for action that moral conclusions supply. In giving this explanation, however, we must address the problem of the moral “must”—the seeming necessity of moral demands—in two slightly different forms. **The fact that an action would be wrong constitutes suffcient reason not to do it** (almost?) **no matter what other considerations there might be in its favor**. If there are circumstances in which an agent could have suf~cient reason to do something that he or she knew to be wrong, these are at best very rare. But if right and wrong always or even almost always take precedence over other values, this is something that requires explanation. How can it make sense, if we recognize values other than right and wrong and take them seriously, to claim that reasons of this one kind have priority over all the rest? I will refer to this as the problem of the *priority* of right and wrong over other values. This is the ~rst way in which moral reasons seem to have a special force that needs to be explained. The second concerns our attitude toward people who are not moved by considerations of right and wrong. Failure to see the reason-giving force of such considerations strikes us as a particularly serious fault.

And, Contractualism accounts for moral motivation through reasonable rejection. **Scanlon 2:** Scanlon, Thomas. *What We Owe to Each Other*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap of Harvard UP, 2000. Print.

**Contractualism** offers such an account. It **holds that an act is wrong if its performance under the circumstances would be disallowed by any set of principles [and]** for the general regulation of behavior **that no one could reasonably reject as a basis for informed**, unforced **general agreement**.8 I will defer discussion of the normative content of this account until later chapters. It should at least be clear, however, that it overlaps to a signi~cant degree with Mill’s de~nition of wrongness while not coinciding with it exactly. **If we** all **have good reason to want acts** of a certain kind **not to be performed**, **then** it is likely that **any principles allowing such acts** could be reasonably rejected, hence that they **will be wrong**. But it does not follow that this will be so in every case in which a greater balance of happiness would result from such acts’ being punished. According to contractualism, thinking about right and wrong is in one respect like thinking about the civil and criminal law: it involves thinking about how there is reason to want people in general to go about deciding what to do. But thinking about right and wrong differs from thinking about law in a number of crucial ways. One of these is that the reasons that guide us in thinking about what the law should be are commonly very different from the “sanction” that moves us to obey it (whether this is fear of punishment or a sense of obligation). In the case of **the morality of right and wrong**, however, these two kinds of reasons **flow from the** same more general reason: the **reason we have to live with others on terms that they could not reasonably reject insofar as they also are motivated by this ideal. Because we have** this **reason** we have reason **to attend** **to the question** of **which** **actions are right and which wrong**, that is, **to try to determine what would be allowed by principles that others could not reasonably reject**, and we also have reason to govern our practical thought and our conduct in the ways that these principles require. This account of moral motivation has much in common with an- other idea mentioned by Mill. In the chapter of *Utilitarianism* devoted to moral motivation Mill does not appeal directly to the substantive value of “the greatest happiness of the greatest number,” but invokes instead what he calls “the social feelings of mankind; the desire to be in unity with our fellow creatures.”9 **The ideal to which contractualism appeals—that of being able to justify your actions to others on grounds that they could not reasonably reject**—is very similar to Mill’s idea of “unity.” One important difference, however, is that Mill takes himself to be describing a sentiment—a natural feature of hu- man psychology—which explains how the motivation to act in ac- cordance with utilitarianism could arise on some basis other than social conditioning. By contrast, on the account I am offering **there is no need to appeal to a special psychological element** to explain how a person could be moved to avoid an action by the thought that any principle allowing it would be one that others could reasonably reject. This is adequately explained by the fact that people have reason to want to act in ways that could be justi~ed to others, together with the fact that when a rational person recognizes something as a reason we do not need a further explanation of how he or she could be moved to act on it. The reason which contractualism emphasizes, the reason we have to want to be able to justify our actions to others on grounds that they (if similarly motivated) could not reasonably reject, must be distinguished from the reasons we often have for wanting to be able to justify our actions to others on grounds that they actually do or will accept. It would be pleasant to live in actual harmony with others and to have them approve of the way we behave toward them, and it is unpleasant to be in con\_ict with those around us and to suffer their disapproval.

Thus, the standard is consistency with contractualism.

To clarify, no actual contract is formed—only an imaginary agreement by reasonable persons motivated by desire for such an agreement. This tests principles of conduct by their hypothetical acceptability from all points of view. **Nagel 3:** Nagel, Thomas [University Professor of Philosophy and Law at New York University]. “Scanlon’s Moral Theory” in *Concealment and Exposure & Other Essays*. Oxford University Press, 2002. Print. pp. 149-150.

The nerve of Scanlon’s position is that **reasonable grounds for rejecting a principle come from the points of view of** distinct **individuals rather than from a**ny **collective** or impersonal **point of view.** Utilitarianism would require us to accept principles that maximize the expected sum of human well-being, and reject those that do not, because the point of view from which acceptance or rejection is determined is that of impartial benevolence toward all. Scanlon, by contrast, believes **one could reasonably reject** certain **principles that would maximize total well-being in favor of** other **principles that** would produce a lower expected total but that **have other virtues—**they are less unfair, they do not impose such severe burdens on anyone, or they do not require the abandonment of important values not reducible to well-being. The reasonableness of an individual’s rejection of a principle depends on his taking the points of view of other individuals into account, but it does not depend on conformity to the verdict of an external point of view that is not that of any individual.

In Calculating impacts we must take into account: 1. The individualist restriction: In rejecting some moral principle, we must appeal to a principle's implications only for ourselves and for other *single* people. Thus, the justifiability of a moral principle depends only on individuals' reasons for objecting to that principle.2. Impersonalist restriction- In rejecting some moral principle, we cannot appeal to claims about the impersonal goodness of outcomes only how is effects individuals.

Additional reasons to prefer:

First, Moral values must hold significance, only contractualism can account for this through our relations. Scanlon 3: Scanlon, Thomas. *What We Owe to Each Other*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap of Harvard UP, 2000. Print.

In our assessments of ourselves and others, being “left cold” by morality counts as a more important fault than merely failing to see the force of reasons of some other kind. The task of this section is to show how contractualism can explain this importance. Let me begin by considering some of the things that we might say about amoralists, who can understand the difference between right and wrong but do not see, and perhaps even deny, that it is anything they have reason to care about. First, unless their situation differs from ours in ways that are morally relevant, we must say that the moral reasons that apply to us apply to these people as well. This much is required by what I called, in Chapter 1, the universality of reason judgments. Looked at in this way, their case is quite different from that of people who “have different tastes,” such as those who do not enjoy skiing or do not like the taste of bananas. In these cases, the main point of the activities in question is a certain kind of enjoyment; so people who do not get this enjoyment from the activities lack reasons to engage in them. But morality is not aimed at enjoyment, so the reasons to give it a place in one’s life are not conditional in this way. Failure to care about right and wrong does not make a person irrational in the sense in which I am using that word, but a person who is left cold by moral considerations does fail to appreciate reasons that apply to him or her. Just saying this, however, does not seem to capture the seriousness of such a failure. There are many other cases of people who fail to see the force of certain reasons, such as people who fail to see the value of science or **of historical understanding, and peopl**e who think that the Grand Canyon is just a big ditch that might as well be filled in if that proves to be economically advantageous. All these people can be said to be “missing something” in at least two senses: there is a category of reasons, a form of value, that they are failing to appreciate; and their lives are poorer because of this lack. But it would understate our reaction to an amoralist to say only that he or she is “missing something” in these senses. So we need a further explanation. I should emphasize that what I am trying to explain here is not the special stringency of moral considerations—some special rational force—that moral reasons have over the agents to whom they apply, but rather the special significance for us of someone’s failing to be moved by these reasons.12 To understand this significance it will be helpful to return to a point made at the end of Chapter 1, that the reasons that a person recognizes are important to us because they affect the range of relations we can have with that person. In many cases these effects are quite local. If someone does not see the point of music, or of chess, or does not appreciate the grandeur of nature, then one cannot discuss these things with him or enjoy them together. “Blind spots” such as these may stand in the way of certain relations with a person, but they leave much of life untouched. A person who cannot share our enthusiasm for one or another valuable pursuit can still be a good neighbor, co-worker, or even friend. The effects of a failure to be moved by considerations of right and wrong are not, however, confined in this way. This failure makes a more fundamental difference because what is in question is not a shared appreciation of some external value but rather the person’s attitude toward us— specifically, a failure to see why the justifiability of his or her actions to us should be of any importance.13 Moreover, this attitude includes not only us but everyone else as well, since the amoralist does not think that anyone is owed the consideration that morality describes just in virtue of being a person. People with a consuming interest in one activity often feel that a large gulf separates them from those who cannot see the point or value of that pursuit. The gulf that some religious people feel separates them from unbelievers may be an extreme case of this. But even this feeling of distance has the personal character I have just mentioned only if the believer feels that denying his religion involves denying his standing as a person and that of others as well. Conceivably, some believers may see things this way. What I am suggesting is that almost all of us have reason to see the gulf separating us from an “amoralist” as having this character, and that this accounts for the special importance we attach to seeing the force of moral considerations.14

**2.** Individuals give others’ moral reasons equal weight in their moral reasoning. **Scanlon 4:** Scanlon, Thomas. *What We Owe to Each Other*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap of Harvard UP, 2000. Print. Scanlon, Thomas. *What We Owe to Each Other*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap of Harvard UP, 2000. Print.

Different people can have different reasons for action, because of differences in their circumstances, their interests, and their intentions. People can also disagree about reasons, and I have been defending the view that people can be mistaken about their reasons for action—not just mistaken about what will promote their ends, but mistaken in having those ends to begin with. Attempts to claim this kind of objectivity for judgments about reasons are sometimes viewed with suspicion, on the ground that they are driven by a desire to claim the authority to criticize others and to tell them what to do. I therefore want to say something here about the diverse reasons we have for caring about what reasons other people have and about what reasons they take themselves to have. What should be said first is that there is fundamentally no question of why we should be concerned with the reasons that other people have. We must be so concerned, insofar as we take ourselves to have any reasons at all, since any judgment about our own reasons entails claims about the reasons that others have or would have in certain circumstances. I have already made this point in passing in discussing our reasons for resisting the idea that all reasons have subjective conditions, but it is important enough to merit fuller discussion. Suppose Jane looks out her window after a snowstorm and sees her neighbor shoveling his driveway. The snow is heavy. He is already panting, and he still has a long way to go. Jane sees that he could use help, and she takes this as a reason to get her shovel and go out. Even though she may not make them explicit to herself at the time, there are certain features of her neighbor’s situation and her own in virtue of which she takes this consideration to be a reason. Perhaps she thinks that she has a reason to help only because she cares about her neighbor, or only because she would enjoy helping, or only because she expects to need his help in the future and wants to make it harder for him to refuse. On the other hand, she may be a strict moralist who thinks that she has a reason to provide such help whether she feels like it or not. Leaving this question open, let G be the set of factors, whatever they may be, in virtue of which Jane takes herself to have reason to help her neighbor. Since she accepts the judgment that, given G, she has reason to help her neighbor, Jane is also committed to the view that anyone else who stands in the relation described by G to someone in need of help has reason to provide it. This is an instance of what I will call the universality of reason judgments. This is not a moral principle; Jane may be moved by moral considerations or she may not.62 It is not even a substantive claim about the considerations that count as reasons, since the contents of G have been left entirely open. In particular, the universality of reason judgments is not something that should be a matter of controversy between those who hold, and those who deny, that all our reasons, or certain of them, have subjective conditions. Even if all reasons are based on desires, the universality of reason judgments still holds that if I have a reason to do something because it will satisfy my desire, then anyone else who has that same desire (and whose situation is like mine in other relevant respects) also has this reason. The universality of reason judgments is a formal consequence of the fact that taking something to be a reason for acting is not a mere pro-attitude toward some action, but rather a judgment that takes certain considerations as sufficient grounds for its conclusion. Whenever we make judgments about our own reasons, we are committed to claims about the reasons that other people have, or would have under certain circumstances. We thus have wholly self-regarding reasons for having views about the correctness or incorrectness of the judgments people make about the reasons they have, since these judgments imply conclusions about the reasons we have. So situations can arise in which, if their judgments about their reasons for action are correct, our judgments about our own reasons must be mistaken. In order for such conflicts to be real, both parties must be making judgments about the same thing: for example, about whether certain considerations do in fact count in favor of a given attitude for a person in a certain situation. This means that they must be talking about the same attitude and that they must be employing similar sets of evaluative categories.

3. Prefer substantive accounts of morality to formal accounts of morality. **Scanlon 5:** Scanlon, Thomas. *What We Owe to Each Other*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap of Harvard UP, 2000. Print.

Explanations of the importance of morality and its reason-giving force can also be compared along another dimension, according to their degree of formality or, on the other hand, of substantive content. The strategy of formal explanations is to appeal to considerations that are as far as possible independent of the appeal of any particular ends. Kant’s theory is a leading example insofar as he undertakes to show that anyone who regards him- or herself as a rational agent is commit- ted to recognizing the authority of the Categorical Imperative. Habermas also appears to follow a formal strategy insofar as he argues that valid moral principles can be derived in argument following rules that must be presupposed by anyone who undertakes to engage in argument at all.2 The alternative strategy is to explain the reason-giving force of moral judgments by characterizing more fully, in substantive terms, the particular form of value that we respond to in acting rightly and violate by doing what is wrong. The aim is to make clearer what this particular form of value is and to make its appeal more apparent. Alasdair MacIntyre has observed, for example, that the Christian version of Aristotelian morality gave morality a twofold point and purpose: to say what will lead to the attainment of man’s true end, and what is required by God’s law.3 These amount, in the terms I am using here, to two substantive accounts of the reason-giving force of morality. MacIntyre contrasts them with what he calls the Enlightenment project of grounding moral requirements in a conception of reason that dispenses both with the idea of divine authority and with that of a distinctive human telos. Insofar as it appeals only to a conception of rationality rather than to any specific good, this is an example of what I am calling a formal strategy. (I leave aside the question of whether this was the “Enlightenment project” and whether it is, as MacIntyre argues, unrealizable.) Formal accounts have been attractive because it has seemed that the force and inescapability of the moral “must” would be well explained by showing that moral requirements are also requirements of rationality, and not dependent on the appeal of any particular good. But although showing this might provide the secure basis that some have sought for the demand that everyone must care about morality, it does not give a very satisfactory description of what is wrong with a person who fails to [care about morality] do so. The special force of moral requirements seems quite different from that of, say, principles of logic, even if both are, in some sense, “inescapable.” And the fault involved in failing to be moved by moral requirements does not seem to be a form of incoherence. For these reasons, looking for a substantive account seems to me a more promising strategy. The main difficulty for such accounts is that it is not clear that they can give sufficiently strong answers to the questions of importance and priority. Once we identify one particular substantive value as the source of moral reasons it may be difficult to explain why that value should take precedence over all others, and why it is a value that, more than any other, everyone must recognize. This difficulty has not seemed insuperable, however, and in fact the accounts of morality that have drawn the widest support have generally been substantive ones. The ideas of God’s will and the human telos, for example, seemed to many to provide successful accounts of morality because they seemed to have the necessary priority and importance. (And there are of course many who think that if these beliefs are lost then no adequate basis for morality can be found.)

I contend that victims subjugated to violence could reasonably reject the privatization of handguns.

# First, A ban would reduce the number of handguns; victims of homicide would reasonably reject a policy allowing the privatization of handguns. Dixon 1: Dixon, Nicholas. "Why We Should Ban Handguns in the United States." . Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 12 (1993): PE

Myhandgun ownership estimates (except the number for Great Britain) are the result of independent inquiries to government agencies in each country. The close coincidence between the rank ordering of handgun ownership and handgun homicide rates in these six diverse countries is most plausibly explained by the causal con- nection I assert. The multiplicity of causes of handgun homicide which opponents of handgun control are eager to assert, and which I accept, make a perfect correlation most unlikely. The one anomaly is the relative position of Australia and Canada; but the the actual handgun homicide numbers (13 and 8, respectively) are so small as to make the difference in homicide rate of little importance. Of more interest than the rank ordering of individual nations, which is more sensitive to "interference" from other causal factors, is the emergence of three clear categories in which handgun ownership and handgun homicide rates coincide: low (Canada, Australia, and Great Britain), moderate (Israel and Sweden), and high (United States**). The most significant fact of all is the vast disparity [exist] between the United States and** allthe **comparison countries in** both the **handgun ownership and** handgun **homicide rates**. I conclude that **a** dramatic **reduction in the handgun ownership rate in this country would substantially reduce handgun homicide rates.** I am assuming that the number of handguns in a country de- pends on (1) the permissiveness of its handgun laws, and (2) the demand for handguns. **Handgun laws in the United States are far more permissive than in any of the comparison countries**.' Since the law is much more easily controlled than the people's wishes, by far the easiest way to reduce handgun ownership is to pass more re- strictive laws. My proposal, then, is that the best way to reduce handgun homicides is to pass maximally restrictive laws - a hand- gun ban. Two interesting points concerning the demand for handguns are worth noting. First, it is probable that, doubtless due in part to the long history of private gun ownership in this country, there is more demand for them in the United States than in the other countries.' In order to achieve the same levels of gun ownership in the United States as in other countries, therefore, it is likely that even more restrictive handgun laws will be required. Second, **a** **reduction in the number of handguns in this country** (by means of a handgun ban) **can** reasonably **be expected to result in a reduction in demand**, **which will in turn cause a further reduction in ownership levels.** This result is because a major reason for handgun ownership at present is to defend oneself against the huge number of people who already have handguns. (See infra section II.E for a discussion of the de- fensive efficacy of handguns.) I propose stemming this spiral of gun ownership at its source rather than simply acquiescing in the unlimit- ed proliferation of handguns.

Thus because victims of handgun crimes would naturally reject the notion that their assailant having a handgun is a good thing, individuals would reasonably reject the allowance of the privatization of handguns and accept policies that aim at reducing them.

And even if they prove there are more or the same amount of crimes and homicides when people don’t have handguns people still wouldn’t reasonably reject that we shouldn’t have handguns because handguns are the cause for those deaths in the first place. Thus, a ban is a step closer to getting rid of hand guns as a whole.

# 2. Victims wouldn’t reasonably reject banning handguns even if faced by an assailant. McMahan: Jeff McMahan *professor of philosophy at Rutgers University;* [*http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/12/19/why-gun-control-is-not-enough/?\_r=0*](http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/12/19/why-gun-control-is-not-enough/?_r=0)*; “*Why Gun ‘Control’ Is Not Enough”; December 19th 2012; PE

Americans are finally beginning to have a serious discussion about guns. **One argument** we’re hearing is the central pillar of the case for private gun ownership: **that we are all safer when more individuals have guns because armed citizens deter crime** and can defend themselves and others against it when deterrence fails. Those who don’t have guns, it’s said, are free riders on those who do, as the criminally disposed are less likely to engage in crime the more likely it is that their victim will be armed. There’s some sense to this argument, for even criminals don’t like being shot. But the logic **is faulty, and** a close look at it **leads to the conclusion that the United States should ban private gun ownership** entirely, or almost entirely. One would think that if widespread gun ownership had the robust deterrent effects that gun advocates claim it has, our country would be freer of crime than other developed societies.  But it’s not.  **When** most **citizens are armed**, as they were in the Wild West, **crime doesn’t cease.  Instead, criminals work to be better armed**, more efficient in their use of guns (“quicker on the draw”), and readier to use them.  When this happens, those who get guns may be safer than they would be without them, but those without them become progressively more vulnerable. Gun advocates have a solution to this: the unarmed must arm themselves.  But **when more citizens get guns, further problems arise: people who would once have got in a fistfight instead shoot the person** who provoked them; people are shot by mistake or by accident. And with guns so plentiful, any lunatic or criminally disposed person who has a sudden and perhaps only temporary urge to kill people can simply help himself to the contents of Mom’s gun cabinet.  Perhaps most important, **the more people there are who have guns, the less effective the police become.** The power of the citizens and that of the police approach parity.  The police cease to have even a near-monopoly on the use of force. To many devotees of the Second Amendment, this is precisely the point.  As former Congressman Jay Dickey, Republican of Arkansas, said in January 2011, “**We have a right to bear arms because of the threat of government taking over the freedoms we have**.”  The more people there are with guns, the less able the government is to control them.  **But if arming the citizenry limits the power of the government, it does so by limiting the power of its agents**, such as the police. Domestic defense becomes more a matter of private self-help and vigilantism and less a matter of democratically-controlled, public law enforcement. Domestic security becomes increasingly “privatized.”

Thus outweighs, individuals using handguns for self-defense have other means than handguns but victims of gun crimes would reasonably reject handguns in every instance because there is no other concealed weaponry that could kill you with a pull of a trigger.

And Handgun opponents have the burden of proof because empirical evidence points otherwise. **Dixon 2:** Dixon, Nicholas. "Why We Should Ban Handguns in the United States." . Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 12 (1993): PE

This brief discussion of the deterrent effect of CP illustrates how **the burden of proof principles** which I outline above **apply to** a concrete situation that is in some ways analogous to **the handgun control debate**. First, **given the strong empirical evidence that CP is not a superior deterrent**, the burden of proof is on those who believe that it is. **They need to produce plausible explanations of why CP is the best deterrent**, even though the evidence fails to bear this out. It is fair to say that **supporters** of CP have been reasonably successful in suggesting causal hypotheses that account for the lack of empirical support for their belief. However, they **have fallen short of showing that these causal hypotheses are in fact correct**. **In other words, showing that the evidence is compatible with CP's superiority as a deterrent fails to meet the burden of proving that it is in fact a superior deterrent.** This, I contend, is the situation in which those who deny my causal hypothesis concerning the prevalence of handguns and the handgun murder rate find themselves. Opponents have shown that it is possible that my hypothesis is false (which I have never denied, since it is not claimed to be a deductively valid argument); but they have failed to give any good reason to believe that it is infact false. Second, **if**, on the other hand, **there were a substantially lower murder rate in states and countries that have CP,** **the burden of proof would shift.** It would then be encumbent on opponents of CP to explain why, appearances to the contrary, CP is not a better deter- rent than other punishments for murder. It seems very likely that many of those who currently oppose CP on utilitarian grounds would abandon their opposition in the face of such hypothetical evidence. The evidentiary situation with regard to the connection between the ownership of firearms and the murder rate is, on the surface, more clear-cut than in the case of CP. When comparing the United States with most other developed countries, there is an astounding disparity with regard to both the handgun homicide rate and the handgun ownership rate. By parity of reasoning, then, **it** **is fair to insist that opponents of a handgun ban abandon their view unless they can explain why their view is correct in spite of the evidence.**

And Util affirms,

First Banning Handguns reduces violent crimes. **Donohue:** John Donohue the Raymond Vernon Senior Lecturer in Public Policy ;August 27th 2015; “Ban guns, end shootings? How evidence stacks up around the world”; http://www.cnn.com/2015/08/27/opinions/us-guns-evidence/

For years, **the NRA mantra has been that allowing citizens to carry concealed handguns would reduce crime** as they fought off or scared off the criminals. Some early studies even purported to show that so-called right to carry laws (RTC) did just that, but[a 2004 report](http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?isbn=0309091241" \t "_blank)from the National Research Council refuted that claim (saying it was not supported by "the scientific evidence"), while remaining uncertain about what the true impact of RTC laws was. Ten years of additional data have allowed new research to get a better fix on this question, which is important since the NRA is pushing for a Supreme Court decision that would allow RTC as a matter of constitutional law .The **new research on this issue from my research team at Stanford** University **has given** the most compelling **evidence** to date **that RTC laws are associated with significant increases in violent crime** -- particularly for aggravated assault. **Looking at** Uniform **Crime Reports** data **from 1979-2012,** we find that, on average**, the 33 states that adopted RTC laws over this period experienced violent crime rates that are 4%-19% higher after 10 years than if they had not adopted these laws.** This hardly makes a strong case for RTC as a constitutional right. At the very least more research is needed to estimate more precisely exactly how much violent crime such a decision would unleash in the states that have so far resisted the NRA-backed RTC laws.In the meantime, can anything make American politicians listen to the preferences of the 90% on the wisdom of adopting universal background checks for gun purchases?

Second, Studies show that a ban of private handguns significantly lowers homicides. **Dixon:** Dixon, Nicholas. "Why We Should Ban Handguns in the United States." . Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 12 (1993): PE

Scepticism as to the value of international comparisons con- cerning gun control and gun related crime is even less plausible in light of a study done in 1988.'5 **In order to isolate the key variable-the impact of gun control on violent crime** **in** general and on **firearm violence in particular-the authors studied two cities that are very similar in most other respects: Seattle and Vancouver**, Cana- da.36 **The two cities have a similar population, geography, climate, level of schooling, unemployment rate, median annual household income, and cultural values.**37 Of particular interest, however, is the great similarity in their overall crime statistics. Vancouver had a very slightly higher burglary rate, and in other types of crime, Seattle had a slightly higher relative risk: robbery (1.09:1), simple assault (1.18:1), and aggravated assault (1.16:1)." With regard to the weap- ons used in aggravated assaults, both cities reported almost identical rates of assaults with knives, other dangerous weapons, and hands and feet." These similarities are in precisely the same factors to which gun control opponents usually appeal in order to account for the higher rate of gun violence in the United States. At this point the similarities in crime patterns end. **In the period studied, Seattle had 11.3 homicides per 100,000 person-years, whereas Vancouver had 6.9 per 100,000 person-years**. Consequently, the relative risk of being murdered in Seattle as compared to Vancouver was 1.63:1.4' The relative risk of homicide excluding those committed with firearms was very similar (1.08:1), but the risk of being murdered with a firearm in Seattle as compared to Vancouver was 4.8:1.42 **Eighty- five percent of the firearms homicides in both cities were committed with handguns.**43 It will be difficult to deny that the almost fivefold difference in the frequency of homicides committed with firearms is responsible for the substantially higher homicide rate in Seattle.' One marked difference between the two cities is that Vancou- ver, like all of **Canada, has significantly stricter gun control laws**.45 **The most important difference is that Vancouver does not allow concealed weapons and grants handgun permits for sporting** and collecting **purposes only.'** Handguns may be transported by car only if they are stored in the trunk in a locked box.47 **In Seattle, concealed weapons are allowed with a permit.**" This has resulted in a dispari- ty in the rates of gun ownership in the two cities. In the 1984-88 period, the total number of handgun permits issued in Vancouver was 4137.'9 In the same time span, Seattle issued 15,289 concealed- weapons permits; in addition, no permit at all was needed for hand- guns kept at home.' An independent measure of gun ownership is provided by "Cook's gun prevalence index," which is based on sur- veys and the number of suicides, assaults, and homicides involving firearms in forty-nine cities in the United States. The index assigns a 41% gun ownership rate to Seattle, and only 12% to Vancouver5.1 To summarize, we have two cities which closely resemble each other in terms of sociology, population, economics, culture, and overall crime patterns, including nonhomicidal violent crime. However, there is a noticeable disparity in their rates of homicide and a huge dif- ference in their rates of gun-related homicide. The city with the lower homicide rates has far stricter gun control laws (especially for handguns, which were responsible for 85% of the firearms-related murders in both cities), and, not surprisingly, a far lower rate of gun ownership. The burden is on opponents of gun control to show why this study does not demonstrate the rink between rates of gun ownership and homicide rates.

# And, Banning the privatization of handguns would not violate an individuals right to self defense. McMahan: Jeff McMahan *professor of philosophy at Rutgers University;* [*http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/12/19/why-gun-control-is-not-enough/?\_r=0*](http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/12/19/why-gun-control-is-not-enough/?_r=0)*; “*Why Gun ‘Control’ Is Not Enough”; December 19th 2012; PE

Gun advocates sometimes argue that a prohibition would violate individuals’ rights of self-defense. Imposing a ban on guns, they argue, would be tantamount to taking a person’s gun from her just as someone is about to kill her. But this is a defective analogy. **Although a prohibition would deprive people of one effective means of self-defense**, **it would also ensure that there would be far fewer occasions on which a gun would be necessary** or even useful **for self-defense**. For guns would be forbidden not just to those who would use them for defense but also to those who would use them for aggression. **Guns are only one means of self-defense** and self-defense is only one means of achieving security against attack. It is the right to security against attack that is fundamental. **A policy that unavoidably deprives a person of one means of self-defense but on balance substantially reduces her vulnerability to attack is therefore respectful** of the more fundamental right from which the right of self-defense is derived.